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Abstract 
 
This study contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and focusing 
on foreign aid instability instead of foreign aid. We assess the role of foreign aid instability on 
governance dynamics in fifty three African countries for the period 1996-2010. An autoregressive 
endogeneity-robust Generalized Method of Moments is employed. Instabilities are measured in 
terms of variance of the errors and standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, 
namely: total aid, aid from multilateral donors and bilateral aid. Principal Component Analysis is 
used to bundle governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice & accountability and 
political stability/no violence), economic governance (regulation quality and government 
effectiveness), institutional governance (rule of law and corruption-control) and general 
governance (political, economic and institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid 
instability increases governance standards, especially political and general governance. Policy 
implications are discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
 The positioning of this inquiry is motivated by two main factors in order to fill the gaps in 
the foreign aid literature and evolving paradigms in the conception of governance. First, we 
complement recent foreign aid literature by incorporating the notion of instability in the light of 
recent events and debates in the literature. Second, we bundle governance indicators in order to 
articulate hitherto unexplored governance concepts.  
On the first contribution, the recent financial crisis has led to a decline in development 
assistance from developed countries to their less developed counterparts (Dang et al., 2013). 
Many studies have found economic and financial crises in developed countries to be significant 
determinants of foreign aid flows to developing countries (Pallage and Robe, 2001; Berthelemy 
and Tichit,  2004; Bulir and Hamann 2008; Kharas, 2008; Roodman, 2008; Chauvet and 
Guillamont, 2009; Frot, 2009; Mendoza et al., 2009; Fuchs et al., 2014; Tingley, 2010;  Dabla-
Norris et al., 2015; Reinsberg, 2015;  Heinrich et al., 2017). It is important to note that Mendoza 
et al. (2009) have shown that increases in stock market uncertainty (a proxy for economic 
uncertainty and financial volatility) reduce aid from the United States, while Fuchs et al. (2014) 
posit that financial crises are not significantly linked to the donor’s foreign aid disbursements. 
Conversely, Dabla-Norris et al. (2015) establish that in periods of economic stress, foreign aid 
from donors is reduced.  
 In the light of the above, the 2008 financial crisis has reignited the debate over the effects 
of foreign aid on the development of recipient countries. To this end, whereas a recent stream of 
literature has confirmed the positive impact on development (Gyimah-Brempong and Racine, 
2014; Kargbo and Sen, 2014), another strand motivated by the recent financial crisis has 
seriously questioned aid effectiveness (Marglin, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Banuri, 2013; Krause, 2013; 
Titumir and Kamal, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Monni and Spaventa, 2013; Asongu, 2014a, 
2015a). Some of the conclusions have included, inter alia: neo-colonialism as the prime 
motivation of foreign aid  to less developed countries (Amin, 2014); the entrapment of African 
countries within neo-colonial webs (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013); the need to strategically limit 
overly foreign aid  reliance from developed countries (Kindiki, 2011);  the imperative for foreign 
aid policies to be based on the needs of recipient nations (Obeng-Odoom, 2013) and the 
questionable economics of development assistance for inclusive human development (Asongu, 
2014b).  
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 According to Dang et al. (2013), with the global economic downturn, international aid to 
the developing world has decreased by an average of 20 to 25 percent. The fact that donors may 
be less able or willing to meet aid promises and engagements during crises results in significant 
macroeconomic instabilities/challenges for high aid-dependent developing countries. While such 
instabilities in foreign aid may be viewed in a negative light by recipients, there is an evolving 
stream of literature suggesting the contrary (see Moore, 2008; Mahon, 2004, 2005; Morton, 1994; 
Bernstein and Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009; Eubank, 2012; Asongu, 2015b). 
 This study contributes to the attendant literature by bundling governance dynamics and 
focusing on foreign aid instability, instead of foreign aid. Accordingly, this study steers clear of 
the engaged literature by employing ‘foreign aid instability’ instead of foreign aid itself. The  
relevance of introducing this concept in Section 2.1 is threefold, notably: (i) the nature of 
instability in the international aid system, (ii) why/how foreign aid instability could affect 
recipient governments, and (iii) the assumption of ‘aid volatility’ as ‘aid instability’. 
 The second contribution of this study to the literature builds on evolving paradigms of 
governance which are fundamentally motivated by the need to bundle governance variables in 
order to provide more robust policy implications (Asongu and Ssozi, 2016;   Ajide and Raheem, 
2016a, 2016b; Amavilah et al., 2017; Asongu et al., 2019). For instance, the emphasis on 
political governance versus economic governance is important in the foreign aid literature 
because of an apparent gap in the literature on the conception and application of governance.  
Accordingly, the governance concept has been employed in recent foreign aid literature without a 
comprehensive measurement. For example, Kangoye (2013) has used the term ‘corruption-
control’ as ‘governance’. In essence, restricting the concept of governance to corruption could be 
misleading because, while corruption is employed as the dependent variable of interest, 
governance is used in the title. Moreover, it is not plausible to employ the term governance unless 
it is a composite measurement that encompasses a multitude of conceptually distinct governance 
variables. We address the aforementioned shortcomings by using ten bundled and unbundled 
governance indicators, namely: political governance (voice and accountability and political 
stability/no violence); economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality); 
institutional governance (corruption-control and the rule of law) and general governance 
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(economic, political and institutional governances)2. In the light of the introductory insights the 
research question which this research aims to answer is the following: how does foreign aid 
instability affect governance in Africa? 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 clarifies the concepts of aid 
instability and governance. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis 
and discussion of results are covered in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with future research 
directions.  
 
2. Aid Instability and Clarification of Governance  
2.1 Aid unpredictability: views and assumptions  
 We devote some space to discussing: (i) some summary insights into the nature of 
instability in the international aid system; (ii) why/how aid instability might influence recipient 
governments, and (iii) the assumption of ‘aid volatility’ as ‘aid instability’. These strands of 
literature are consistent with the mainstream literature on aid volatility, notably: Kharas (2008), 
who has focused on measuring the cost of foreign aid volatility; Bulir and Hamann (2008), who 
have found that the volatility of flows in aid is higher than that of domestic income in developing 
countries, while Chauvet and Guillamont (2009) are concerned with clarifying when aid volatility 
matters in the nexus between foreign aid and economic growth.  
 According to Kangoye (2003), some sources of aid can be unstable for a plethora of 
reasons. They are: (i) Aid may be unstable because the approval of aid disbursements is from 
multiple actors (e.g., parliamentary versus executive powers). (ii) The economic/financial 
conditions of donors may change because of multiple factors,  among other things negative 
economic shocks like global financial/economic crises,(iii) Donor priorities for recipient 
countries may change owing to unstable events like natural catastrophes in some of them, such 
that more (less) aid is disbursed to affected (non-affected) recipients. The above factors may be 
sources of variations between commitments and actual disbursements. According to the authors, 
aid flows are less predictable in nations that are not strongly covered by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) programmes. Moreover, Lemma (2004) has established that in some aid 
                                                 
2
 It is important to note that ‘general governance’ is different from other governance dynamics (political, economic 
and institutional) because it captures all other governance dynamics. Every governance category has a distinct 
definition and measurement.  
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categories, only a small fraction (about 12 percent in certain cases) of initial disbursements 
eventually trickle-down to recipient countries themselves.   
 The underlying gap between commitment and actual disbursements affect aid-dependent 
countries in a multitude of ways, notably in their domestic macroeconomic management and 
development programmes (Kangoye, 2013). Some documented consequences of ‘aid instability’ 
on recipient governments include: (i) the difficulty of fiscal planning for the nation’s 
development based on the assumption that government planning may be long-term while aid 
commitments are short-run; (ii) monetary and fiscal instability; (iii) pro-cyclicality in aid which 
increases volatility in economic output and (iv) an increase in political accountability due to more 
reliance on domestic taxation for public income. While the first-two points are from Kangoye 
(2013), the third and fourth points are respectively from Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and 
Asongu (2015b).  The third point is consistent with Lensink and Morrissey because they have 
argued that it is difficult establishing a significant growth effect from aid unless some indicator 
capturing instability in aid is factored into the regression. Conversely, predictability of aid can 
create over dependence of recipients on donors.  
 In the underlying literature, Lensink and Morrissey (op.cit) have used the term 
‘instability’ interchangeably with ‘uncertainty’, whereas Kangoye (op.cit) has used ‘instability’ 
interchangeably with ‘unpredictability’. We prefer to use the term ‘instability’ interchangeably 
with ‘volatility’ because equating volatility with unpredictability may not be a perfectly 
defensible assumption. This is essentially because the underlying equation is based on the 
hypothesis that there is a constant stream of aid flows and the sources of volatility are not the 
result of an aid programme stopping in a predictable manner. In essence, the implicit assumption 
that volatility implies unpredictability is short of substance. This is because, whereas volatility 
may result from events like the global economic crisis (which was not predictable for the most 
part), volatility may also result from aid programmes starting and stopping in an entirely 
predictable manner.  
 While Kangoye (2013) has concluded that foreign aid unpredictability is linked to more 
corruption and by extension bad governance standards, this study argues that foreign aid 
instability can also be associated with good governance. In essence, foreign aid instability can 
provide incentives for governments to be more accountable to citizens in exchange for more tax 
income. This is essentially because the electorate has been documented to be prepared to pay 
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more taxes only in exchange for better governance standards (Morton, 1994; Mahon, 2004, 2005; 
Moore, 2008; Bernstein and Lu, 2008; Prichard, 2009; Eubank, 2012). The underlying 
governance standards entail political, economic and institutional dimensions of governance which 
are clarified in the next section.  
 The intuition for the study above is investigated within an applied econometrics 
framework. Hence, because this research is framed as an applied economics study, an established 
theoretical underpinning is not indispensable to support the empirical analysis. This is essentially 
because of the wealth of theoretical literature on the relationship between aid and development 
outcomes in developing countries (Easterly, 1999; Asongu and Jellal, 2016). Hence, this research 
is consistent with a contemporary strand of literature arguing that applied econometrics is not 
necessarily limited to the acceptance and rejection of established theoretical underpinnings 
(Costantini and Lupi, 2005; Narayan et al., 2011; Asongu et al., 2018). Applied econometrics 
could pave the way to theory-building, especially in the light of a relationship that has not yet 
been established in the literature. Therefore, the study is consistent with the underlying 
contemporary literature in arguing that applied econometrics based on a sound intuition and the 
need to address a gap in the literature, is a useful scientific activity.  
 
2.2 Clarification of governance  
  
 This section is devoted to clarifying the concept of governance adopted. We discuss it in 
two principal strands, notably definitions of governance and debates surrounding the governance 
concepts to be adopted in the paper.   
 The perception of governance is complex and multidimensional and can take several 
definitions (Asongu, 2016).  First, according to Dixit (2009), economic governance can be 
defined as  ‘…structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic 
activity and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contract, and taking 
collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure’(p.5). Second, Tusalem 
(2015) understands governance as consisting of regulation quality, political stability, rule of law, 
bureaucratic effectiveness and corruption-control. Third, Fukuyama (2013) has said that 
governance should comprehensively embody four principal measures, namely: bureaucratic 
measures, procedural measures, output measures and capacity indicators which entail both 
professionalism and resources. Fourth, to the best of our knowledge, the most widely employed 
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governance indicators in the literature are from Kaufmann et al. (2010). These consist of three 
main governance categories: institutional, economic and political governances. Institutional 
governance is defined as respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions 
between them. It is measured with two variables: corruption-control and the rule of law. 
Economic governance is defined as the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public goods and services. It is also measured with two indicators: regulation quality and 
government effectiveness. Political governance is defined as the election and replacement of 
political leaders. It is measured with two main indicators, political stability/no violence and voice 
and accountability.  
 In spite of some criticisms that have arisen in policy-making and scholarly circles, 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi have promptly responded with rebuttals to defend the 
confidence enjoyed by the underlying governance variables in scholarly circles. As far as we 
have reviewed, one of the most interesting debates has been with Andrew Schrank and Marcus 
Kurtz. The reader can find more insights into the highlighted debate in: ‘models, measures and 
mechanisms’  (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a); a reply (Kaufmann et al., 2007a); a defense (Kurtz & 
Schrank, 2007b)  and a rejoinder (Kaufmann et al., 2007a). In light of the debate, we have found 
the reply and rejoinder from Kaufmann et al. (2007a, 2017b) very informative on the quality of 
governance indicators from the World Governance Indicators of the World Bank.  
 The debate begins with Kurtz and Schrank (2007a) raising doubts about the positive 
association between good governance and economic development. They have argued that it is 
essential to (i) question the confidence enjoyed by the World Bank governance indicators and (ii) 
rethink the consensus upon which the causality flowing from governance to economic 
development is based. The authors have gone further to establish that the World Bank governance 
indicators are liable of, inter alia: conceptual conflation with policy choices, perceptual biases 
and sample adverse selection. Kaufmann et al. (2007a) have replied with three clarifications in 
order to show that the claims from the contending authors are not substantiated. They have 
demonstrated that the suggestions on perception-oriented measurement biases are speculative, 
falsifiable and short of empirical scrutiny. They have furher provided empirical substantiation to 
the argument that short-run nexuses discussed by the Andrew Schrank and Marcus Kurtz are 
conceptually flawed and statistically fragile. They have finally disqualified the empirical 
substantiation of the contending authors on the impact of governance on growth.  
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 In defense of their  stance, Kurtz and Schrank (2007b) have responded by further arguing 
that the underlying issues about measurement and conceptual clarity are deeply rooted in the 
debate bordering the relationship between governance and growth. In a rejoinder, Kaufmann et 
al. (2007b)  deliberated on the absence of empirical backing with which to substantiate criticisms 
from contending authors. They have further argued that issues related to ‘potential respondant 
bias’ which are not exclusively restricted to the measurement of government effectiveness, but 
also apply to other variables.  
In this light, the study adopts the governance indicators from Kaufmann et al, consistent 
with a recent stream of literature on unbundling (Gani, 2011; Andrés & Asongu, 2013; Andrés et 
al., 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Pelizzo et al., 2016; Pelizzo & 
Nwokora, 2016, 2018; Nwokora & Pelizzo, 2018) and bundling (Asongu, 2016; Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2016b) governance dynamics.   
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 We examine a sample of fifty three African countries using annual data from the African 
Development Indicators of the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. South Sudan is excluded 
from the fifty four African countries because data for the country is not available before 2011. 
Good governance indicators from the World Bank are only available from 1996. The temporal 
and geographical scopes of the study are determined by constraints in data availability at the time 
of the study.  
The choice of three non-overlapping intervals (NOI) used to periodize the data has a 
fourfold justification. First, one degree of freedom is lost after computation of residuals in the 
first-order autoregressive processes and at least two periods are needed for standard deviations of 
the corresponding residuals to be further computed. Second, averages mitigate short-run or 
business cycle disturbances that may loom substantially large. Third, three-year NOIs ensure that 
the basic conditions for the employment of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) are 
satisfied (N>T: 53>5). Fourth, three-year NOIs restrict overidentification, or limit instrument 
proliferation, by ensuring that the numbers of cross-sections are higher than the number of 
instruments in each specification.  
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 The dependent variables are governance dynamics (political, economic, institutional and 
general). They are obtained from principal component analysis (PCA) discussed in Section 3.2.1 
below.  
 The independent variable of interest is net official development assistance as a percentage 
of Gross Domestic Product (NODA). In order to provide room for more policy implications, we 
add (i) NODA from the Development Assistance Committee as a percentage of GDP 
(NODADAC) and (ii) NODA from Multilateral donors also as a percentage of GDP 
(NODAMD). The instabilities are computed using two approaches. They are (i) simple standard 
deviations of three-year intervals and (ii) variance of the errors or standard deviations of the 
saved residuals after first-order autoregressive processes in the NODA dynamics. The latter 
approach is consistent with Kangoye (op.cit). As we have emphasized in Section 2.1, we equate 
volatility with instability in the study. Two points are worth noting in the computation of 
instability. First, the second measurement of instability (from variance of the errors) is motivated 
by the need to distinguish simple variations (from the first measurement) with more unstable 
factors. Therefore, more unstable changes in aid flows are captured by the second measurement 
of aid instability. Second, the study uses two year averages for the computation of variance of the 
errors (after a loss of one degree of freedom from first autoregressive processes). The 
corresponding low order of non-overlapping intervals enables the study to limit the mitigation of 
short-run or business cycle disturbances that are essential to capture instability as much as 
possible. Therefore, with scholarly modesty in mind, contrary to the Kangoye (2013) 
computation which based on ten year data averages with three-year data averages, the approach 
in this study limits the mitigation of the short-run disturbances that are required to better compute 
instability.  
 We control for inflation, trade openness, economic prosperity and government 
expenditure. Whereas the role of government expenditure is consistent with fiscal behavior in 
governance (Eubank, 2012; Asongu and Jellal, 2013), globalization in terms of trade openness 
has been documented to improve governance (Khandelwal and Roitman, 2012; Asongu, 2014c). 
Economic prosperity and income-levels are instrumental in the quality of government (Asongu, 
2012, p. 191). The sign of inflation on governance remains ambiguous. It may be positive if the 
measures put in place are designed to effectively improve government quality and correct the 
problem. On the other hand, it could substantially affect governance standards negatively if issues 
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of soaring food prices remain unaddressed. The latter constitute factors that culminated in the 
“Arab Spring” (Khandelwal and Roitman, 2012). We also employ time-effects in the 
specifications to further control for unobserved heterogeneity. It is important to note that, 
whereas dummy or fixed effects like legal origins have been documented to affect the quality of 
governance (Anyanwu and Erhijakpor, 2014), unfortunately we cannot control for dummy 
variables in the GMM specification because these are eliminated by first differencing for the 
difference equation of the system GMM.  
 Definition of the variables is presented in Appendix 1, the summary statistics is disclosed 
in Appendix 2 and the correlation analysis in Appendix 3. From the summary statistics it can be 
observed that variables are comparable and from their corresponding variations, we can be 
confident that reasonable estimated relationships will emerge. From the perspective of 
comparable mean values, in statistical analysis, average values should be comparable. For 
instance, tens of units should not be compared with billions of units. On the front of variations, 
considerable variations between variables across time are necessary for the variables to affect one 
another. The correlation analysis has been employed to mitigate multicollinearity and 
overparameterization issues that could arise. These are apparent among NODA instability 
dynamics. We also notice from the summary statistics that the computed ‘aid volatiles’ are quite 
large. Accordingly, for the most part, the variances of ‘aid instability’ indicators are as substantial 
as those of baseline aid variables.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis 
 This section extends the definition of governance from corruption to political, economic, 
institutional and general dynamics. We use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensions of each governance dynamic because some information may be redundant owing to 
the high degrees of substitution. PCA is a widely employed statistical method that consists of 
reducing a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called 
principal components that reflect a substantial variation or proportion of initial information. We 
first reduce all the governance indicators to obtain a general governance measurement before 
further mitigating them into: (i) voice and accountability and political stability for political 
governance (PolGov), (ii) government effectiveness and regulation quality for economic 
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governance (EcoGov) and (iii) corruption-control and rule of law for institutional governance 
(InstGov). The advantage of using PCA over “averaging” is that PCA does not assign equal 
weights in the computation of a composite indicator.  
 The Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) criterion are employed to determine common 
factors. They recommend stopping at first principal components (PCs) with an eigen value 
greater than the mean (or unity). In this light, as shown in Table 1 below: General governance 
(G.Gov) has an eigenvalue of 4.642 and represents more than 77 percent of variation in the six 
government variables (regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control, rule of 
law, political stability/no violence and voice and  accountability); political governance (PolGov) 
summarizes about 82 percent of information with an eigenvalue of 1.852; economic governance 
denotes more than 90 percent of information with an eigenvalue of 1.812 and institutional 
governance represents 93.5 percent of variability with a 1.871 eigenvalue. Consistent with 
Andrés et al. (2015), the following definitions are relevant to governance dynamics: (i) Political 
governance is the process by which those in authority are selected and replaced (ii) Economic 
governance denotes the capacity of government to formulate and implement policies as well as 
deliver services and (iii) Institutional governance represents the respect for citizens and the state 
of institutions that govern the interactions among them.  The three dimensions do not emerge 
endogenously when the first PCA is computed for all World Governance Indicators because the 
six governance indicators are highly correlated. While they are correlated, they reflect different 
concepts of governance, which is the reason the three dimensions of governance are further 
considered in order to articulate political, economic and institutional dimensions of governance.  
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Governance (Gov) 
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.383 0.374 0.403 0.429 0.443 0.413 0.773 0.773 4.642 
Second  PC 0.297 0.774 -0.369 -0.350 -0.021 -0.230 0.077 0.851 0.466 
Third PC 0.750 -0.300 0.353 -0.127 -0.223 -0.396 0.066 0.917 0.398 
          
First PC (PolGov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.170 1.000 0.340 
          
First PC (EcoGov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.906 0.906 1.812 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.093 1.000 0.187 
          
First PC (InstGov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.935 0.935 1.871 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.064 1.000 0.128 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: Political 
Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. PolGov (Political Governance): First 
PC of VA & PS. EcoGov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. InstGov (Institutional Governance): First PC of RL & CC.  
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 Consistent with the underlying literature on bundling institutions (Asongu, 2015c; Asongu 
and Nwachukwu, 2016c, 2016d), is it relevant to engage some issues that might arise in the 
validity of estimated coefficients from PC-augmented regressions. The concerns, to the best of 
our knowledge, were first raised by Pagan (1984, p.242) who established that three main 
anxieties are linked to the use of estimates from initial regressions in second-stage modeling, 
namely concerns about efficiency, consistency and the inferential validity of estimations. Pagan 
argues that whereas estimates from two-step estimation processes are efficient and consistent, not 
all corresponding inferences are valid. The issue about inferences broadly aligns with an 
abundant supply of literature that has focused on the same issue, notably: Oxley and McAleer 
(1993), McKenzie and McAleer (1997), Ba and Ng (2006) and Westerlund and Urbain  (2012, 
2013ab).  
 Narrowing-down the perspective to the specific framework of the PC-derived indicators 
employed in this study, to the best of our knowledge Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b) have 
provided insights into how the concern about inferential validity can be tackled. The authors have 
built on more contemporary literature (Stock and Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Pesaran, 2006; Bai, 
2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012) in order to sustain that normal inferences can be 
established with PC regressors provided that the estimated coefficients converge to their 
corresponding real values at the rate  NT   with N (T) as  the number of cross-sections (time 
series). While the authors have argued that for convergence to be feasible N and T need to be 
sufficiently large, they have stopped short of elucidating how ‘large is large’. Within the specific 
framework of this inquiry, we are faced with three major issues. First, N cannot be stretched 
further because we have included all existing fifty three African countries, with the exception of 
South Sudan for which data was not available before 2011. Second, we cannot extend T to a date 
before 1996 because good governance variables from the World Bank Governance indicators are 
only available therefrom. Third, we cannot employ annual periodicities so as to extend T because 
of analytical and methodological constraints. On the analytical front, the calibration of aid 
instabilities (variance of the errors) require that we use at least three non-overlapping intervals so 
that (i) one degree of freedom is lost after the first autoregressive process and (ii) at least two 
degrees of freedom are required for the computation of variance of the errors (or standard 
deviations of corresponding residuals). At the methodological level, a basic requirement for the 
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adopted GMM technique is that N>T. Hence using non-overlapping intervals also enables the 
study to limit instrument proliferation or over-identification. Above all, recent literature on 
bundling institutions (albeit with lower values of N and T) has established that inferences with 
bundled governance indicators are equally valid (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; Asongu, 2016).   
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 
 The system GMM estimation strategy is adopted for a threefold interest: (i) it accounts for 
some potential endogeneity3; (ii) cross-country regressions are eliminated in the estimation 
process and (iii) biases in the difference estimation resulting from small samples are mitigated 
(Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017; Efobi et al., 2018;  Meniago and Asongu, 2018; Boateng et al., 
2018; Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b; Tchamyou et al., 2019). Hence it is substantially for this third 
point that we are consistent with Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) in choosing the system GMM 
approach (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) instead of the difference 
estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). In the specification, a heteroscedasticity-consistent two-
step approach is preferred to the homoscedasticity-consistent one-step procedure. Two tests are 
performed to ascertain the validity of the models: (i) the Sargan over-identifying restrictions 
(OIR) test for instrument validity and (ii) the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation (AR(2)) test for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. The interests of using data averages in terms of 
three year NOI have already been discussed in the data section.  
 The following equations in levels and first difference represent the GMM approach.    
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 Where: ‘t’ denotes the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. Gov  is Governance; T , Total 
NODA; DAC , NODA from DAC countries; MD , NODA from Multilateral Donors; X is the set 
of control variables (Trade openness, Government expenditure, Inflation and GDP growth); 
                                                 
3
 In essence, the system GMM controls for: (i) autoregressive endogeneity in the dependent variables by exploiting 
all orthogonality conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and error terms; (ii) simultaneity by 
instrumenting the regressors with the first lagged and first differences and (iii) time-invariant omitted variables with 
time fixed effects.  
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i is a country-specific effect;  t  is a time-specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. The 
estimation procedure involves jointly estimating the regression in levels (Eq. [1]) with that in 
first-difference (Eq. (2)), hence exploiting all the parallel or orthogonality conditions between the 
error term and the lagged endogenous variable.  
 In the light of the above, the underlying exclusion restriction assumption is that the lagged 
changes in aid volatility affect governance exclusively through present period aid volatility. The 
use of internal instruments is motivated by the difficulty of finding relevant external instruments. 
In the findings that are reported in the next section, the assumption of exclusive restriction is 
valid if null hypothesis of the Sargan test is not rejected.  
 
4. Empirical results  
 
 While Section 4.1 presents the findings with foreign aid instability as standard deviations, 
Section 4.2 reveals robustness checks with foreign aid instability as variance of the errors 
(standard deviations of the residuals after first-order autoregressive processes). We observe that 
the post-estimation diagnostics test confirms the validity of the models for the most part. 
Accordingly, two tests have been performed to investigate the validity of these models. They are:  
the Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test which investigates the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation and the Sargan-test that assesses the over-identification restrictions. The latter test 
investigates if the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. 
The null hypothesis of this test is the view that the instruments as a group display strict 
exogeneity or do not suffer from endogeneity.  Overwhelmingly for most models, we have 
neither rejected the AR(2) null hypothesis for the absence of autocorrelation nor the Sargan null 
for the validity of the instruments. 
  
4.1 Instability as standard deviations 
 
 Table 2 below assesses the concerns underpinning this paper using the first definition of 
instabilities which is the standard deviation of three-year NOIs. But for a thin exception (first 
model on general governance with a significant Sargan OIR test), the models are overwhelmingly 
valid because the null hypotheses of the AR(2) and Sargan OIR tests are not rejected for the most 
part. The main findings support a positive effect of aid instabilities on political and general 
governances. The comparatively higher magnitude on general governance can be traceable to the 
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fact that political governance is already contained in general governance. Hence, the incremental 
magnitude could be the effect from other constituents of general governance. Accordingly, a one 
standard deviation increase in foreign aid instability is expected to increase, (i) political 
governance by 0.038(6.460×0.006) and 0.096(6.460×0.015) for first and second specifications 
respectively and (ii) general governance by 0.109(6.460×0.017)4. Most of the control variables 
have the expected though insignificant signs.  
   
Table 2: Total foreign aid instability with standard deviations 
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.970*** 1.128*** 1.081*** 0.862*** 0.854*** 0.913*** 1.040*** 0.955*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.067 -0.145 -0.041 -0.007 0.048 0.063 0.008 -0.088 
 (0.358) (0.177) (0.701) (0.963) (0.572) (0.673) (0.944) (0.634) 
NODASD1 (Total) 0.006* 0.015* 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.017** 0.017* 
 (0.054) (0.075) (0.251) (0.582) (0.482) (0.350) (0.044) (0.056) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.004 --- 0.0008 --- 0.009 
  (0.324)  (0.539)  (0.865)  (0.225) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.018 --- 0.004 --- 0.019 
  (0.217)  (0.240)  (0.786)  (0.383) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0005 --- -0.0003 --- 0.0007 
  (0.831)  (0.668)  (0.797)  (0.634) 
Inflation   --- 0.0009 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0007 
  (0.139)  (0.571)  (0.233)  (0.393) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.550) (0.614) (0.395) (0.701) (0.389) (0.300) (0.524) (0.338) 
Sargan OIR (0.599) (0.290) (0.029) (0.196) (0.115) (0.297) (0.071) (0.252) 
Wald  (joint) 91.426*** 953.30*** 102.44*** 1084.3*** 79.441*** 1339.6*** 168.15*** 3076.3*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODA S.D1(Total): Distortions by Simple Standard 
Deviation. 
 
  
 In Table 3 below, specifications of Table 2 are replicated with NODA from DAC 
countries (Panel A) and NODA from Multilateral Donors (Panel B). The models in both panels 
support a positive effect of aid instabilities on political, economic and general governance. The 
comparatively higher magnitude on general governance can be traceable to the fact that political 
and economic governance are already contained in general governance.  
                                                 
4
 6.460 is the standard deviation corresponding to the first measurement of total foreign aid instability (see Appendix 
2).  
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Table 3: DAC and MD foreign aid instability with standard deviations 
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
 Panel A: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
Gov (-1) 0.992*** 1.131*** 1.084*** 0.835*** 0.843*** 0.919*** 1.035*** 0.963*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.054 -0.160 -0.044 0.009 0.055 0.081 0.022 -0.081 
 (0.467) (0.140) (0.677) (0.952) (0.526) (0.581) (0.844) (0.670) 
NODADACSD1  0.002 0.019*** 0.016 0.005 0.0009 0.004 0.019* 0.016** 
 (0.541) (0.000) (0.249) (0.714) (0.844) (0.513) (0.092) (0.041) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.004 --- 0.0007 --- 0.009 
  (0.299)  (0.617)  (0.873)  (0.216) 
GDP growth  --- 0.013 --- 0.019 --- 0.004 --- 0.019 
  (0.188)  (0.223)  (0.771)  (0.357) 
Trade  --- 0.0003 --- 0.0006 --- -0.0004 --- 0.0006 
  (0.752)  (0.605)  (0.740)  (0.686) 
Inflation   --- 0.001* --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0008 
  (0.084)  (0.530)  (0.272)  (0.355) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.646) (0.669) (0.338) (0.682) (0.383) (0.296) (0.560) (0.333) 
Sargan OIR (0.536) (0.281) (0.032) (0.199) (0.120) (0.330) (0.075) (0.244) 
Wald  (joint) 50.416*** 1245.2*** 112.70*** 1085.5*** 48.786*** 1674.0*** 150.14*** 2994*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 55 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
         
 Panel B: Foreign Aid from Multilateral Donors 
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.872*** 1.115*** 1.047*** 0.882*** 0.834*** 0.971*** 1.005*** 0.947*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.078 -0.106 -0.041 -0.037 0.039 0.155 -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.284) (0.378) (0.705) (0.807) (0.644) (0.309) (0.904) (0.903) 
NODAMDSD1 0.039*** 0.011 0.025** 0.039 0.013 0.009 0.052*** 0.032 
 (0.000) (0.748) (0.044) (0.422) (0.211) (0.724) (0.000) (0.493) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.004 --- 0.003 --- 0.001 --- 0.007 
  (0.390)  (0.646)  (0.711)  (0.283) 
GDP growth  --- 0.013 --- 0.020 --- -0.002 --- 0.017 
  (0.224)  (0.194)  (0.865)  (0.462) 
Trade  --- 0.0001 --- 0.0004 --- -0.001 --- 0.0006 
  (0.881)  (0.694)  (0.465)  (0.723) 
Inflation   --- 0.0001 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.743)  (0.300)  (0.178)  (0.678) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.519) (0.700) (0.605) (0.902) (0.406) (0.339) (0.633) (0.364) 
Sargan OIR (0.562) (0.250) (0.035) (0.319) (0.114) (0.562) (0.059) (0.396) 
Wald  (joint) 59.108*** 733.31*** 156.94*** 1280.6*** 74.766*** 1051.6*** 153.56*** 2885*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODAMD: Net 
Official Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. NODADAC SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation.       
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4.2 Robustness checks:  instability as variance of the errors 
 
 Tables 4 and 5 below address the underlying problem using variance of the errors as 
instabilities instead of standard deviations. The variances of the errors are computed as the 
standard deviations of the residuals saved from the first-order autoregressive processes. 
Previously established positive results in relation to the effects on political and general 
governances are confirmed.  
 
Table 4: Total foreign aid instability with variance of the errors 
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.969*** 1.128*** 1.078*** 0.828*** 0.841*** 0.915*** 1.034*** 0.938*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.057 -0.147 -0.025 0.012 0.055 0.078 0.030 -0.068 
 (0.431) (0.165) (0.815) (0.938) (0.513) (0.593) (0.785) (0.691) 
NODA SD2 (Total) 0.003** 0.012** 0.005 0.002 0.0006 0.002 0.009 0.008 
 (0.030) (0.035) (0.468) (0.811) (0.804) (0.514) (0.178) (0.167) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.003 --- 0.0008 --- 0.008 
  (0.333)  (0.633)  (0.861)  (0.238) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.020 --- 0.004 --- 0.021 
  (0.198)  (0.216)  (0.777)  (0.330) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0007 ---  -0.0004 --- 0.0009 
  (0.845)  (0.573)  (0.775)  (0.529) 
Inflation   --- 0.001 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0003 
  (0.119)  (0.457)  (0.267)  (0.689) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.655) (0.673) (0.524) (0.687) (0.381) (0.294) (0.765) (0.307) 
Sargan OIR (0.596) (0.308) (0.024) (0.228) (0.120) (0.350) (0.053) (0.290) 
Wald  (joint) 82.210*** 1065.2*** 84.379*** 1026.0*** 49.500*** 1487.1*** 133.72*** 3105*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODA: Total Net Official Development Assistance. NODAS.D2 (Total): SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation 
of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  
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Table 5: DAC and MD foreign aid instability with variance of the errors  
         
 Dependent variable: Governance  
 Panel A: Foreign Aid from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Countries  
         
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
Gov (-1) 0.985*** 1.131*** 1.078*** 0.810*** 0.838*** 0.917*** 1.032*** 0.950*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.050 -0.149 -0.031 0.021 0.056 0.081 0.035 -0.075 
 (0.499) (0.170) (0.771) (0.890) (0.513) (0.573) (0.750) (0.677) 
NODADAC SD2  0.002 0.013** 0.009 0.002 0.0002 0.002 0.011 0.010* 
 (0.412) (0.014) (0.389) (0.825) (0.935) (0.564) (0.223) (0.097) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.005 --- 0.003 --- 0.0007 --- 0.008 
  (0.306)  (0.683)  (0.873)  (0.220) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.020 --- 0.004 --- 0.021 
  (0.194)  (0.229)  (0.742)  (0.307) 
Trade  --- 0.0002 --- 0.0007 --- -0.0004 --- 0.0007 
  (0.796)  (0.555)  (0.746)  (0.604) 
Inflation   --- 0.001* --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 0.0006 
  (0.099)  (0.464)  (0.273)  (0.504) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.681) (0.684) (0.466) (0.659) (0.382) (0.293) (0.778) (0.320) 
Sargan OIR (0.527) (0.288) (0.027) (0.205) (0.125) (0.360) (0.060) (0.269) 
Wald  (joint) 52.18*** 1318.2*** 95.147*** 1019.6*** 37.637*** 1818.7*** 130.29*** 3194.3*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 18 14 18 14 18 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
         
 Panel B: Foreign Aid from Multilateral Donors 
 Political Governance 
(PolGov) 
Economic Governance 
(EcoGov) 
Institutional 
Governance (InstGov) 
General Governance 
(G.Gov) 
     
Gov (-1) 0.916*** 1.135*** 1.053*** 0.849*** 0.818*** 0.962*** 0.990*** 0.934*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  -0.089 -0.157 -0.047 -0.002 0.044 0.141 -0.013 -0.029 
 (0.243) (0.149) (0.682) (0.989) (0.596) (0.343) (0.913) (0.852) 
NODAMD SD2 0.042*** 0.043 0.020 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.048*** 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.116) (0.111) (0.807) (0.385) (0.612) (0.000) (0.591) 
Gov. Expenditure --- 0.004 --- 0.003 --- 0.001 --- 0.007 
  (0.345)  (0.570)  (0.713)  (0.229) 
GDP growth  --- 0.012 --- 0.021 --- -0.002 --- 0.019 
  (0.257)  (0.166)  (0.890)  (0.408) 
Trade  --- 0.000 --- 0.0006 --- -0.001 --- 0.0008 
  (0.977)  (0.569)  (0.489)  (0.593) 
Inflation   --- 0.0006 --- -0.001 --- 0.001 --- -0.0002 
  (0.261)  (0.304)  (0.210)  (0.743) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.762) (0.652) (0.559) (0.765) (0.416) (0.328) (0.654) (0.331) 
Sargan OIR (0.458) (0.347) (0.030) (0.294) (0.125) (0.550) (0.049) (0.370) 
Wald  (joint) 43.24*** 981.65*** 92.29*** 1052.5*** 35.313*** 1174.1*** 100.18*** 3054.4*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Instruments  14 18 14 14 14 14 14 14 
Countries 51 34 50 34 51 34 50 34 
Observations  199 118 195 118 199 118 195 118 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying  
Restrictions test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in 
bracket. Gov: Government. NODADAC: Net Official Development Assistance from the Development Assistance Committee. NODAMD: Net 
Official Development Assistance from Multilateral Donors. NODADACSD2:  SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation of the Residuals 
after first-order autoregressive processes. DAC: Development Assistance Committee. MD: Multilateral Donors.  
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4. 3: Further discussion and policy implications  
 
4.3.1 Implications for foreign-driven governance  
This section on foreign-driven governance focuses on the use of foreign aid by donors to 
influence governance standards in recipient countries. Accordingly, the decision by a donor to cut 
aid obviously affects the stability of aid5. 
The results accord with a strand of the literature on the conditionality of development 
assistance for political governance purposes in recipient nations (see Stokke, 2013; Hayman, 
2011; Faust, 2010; Killick, 2003; Crawford, 2001; Carothers, 2000; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 
2017a).  Accordingly, development assistance can be a policy instrument employed by developed 
countries for the promotion of political governance in view of enhancing democratic standards 
and human rights. Hence, these developed countries could voluntarily manipulate foreign aid 
with the ultimate goal of reaching the underlying foreign-driven goals of democracy and respect 
for human rights. The case of Zimbabwe over the past decade provides eloquent testimony. In 
essence, calls for regime change by Western nations have been greased by drastically reducing 
the amount of development assistance which Zimbabwe receives from these developed countries 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017c ). Another recent case is the example of Uganda, where in early 
2014 an anti-gay legislation that was signed into law by president Youweri Museveni was not 
welcomed by Donor countries (e.g. Norway, the Netherlands and Denmark) and the World Bank 
with suspensions of aid and loans (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017a).  
 Our findings have shown that such instability/uncertainty in development assistance could 
increase political governance in recipient countries. Hence, even if a ‘foreign aid dictated policy’ 
is unpopular in a recipient nation, the leadership in the recipient nation may be willing to 
compromise by improving political and general governance standards. With the exceptions of 
some emerging countries in East Asia, more concessions have been made by African countries 
under the pressure of aid withdrawal by Western nations (Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017a, 
2017b).   
                                                 
5
 Some of the points raised in the discussion of results are the opinions of authors and should not be construed as 
facts requiring citations. The opinions of authors are tailored such that they are presented in the conditional tense. 
Facts are substantiated with attendant references.  
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 An alternative way of understanding the foreign-driven governance in this strand is that, 
development assistance increases competition for aid and donors offer more rewards to recipient 
countries with better governance compared to their counterparts with poor governance. Hence, an 
atmosphere of aid rent-seeking may induce positive competition in terms of improving 
governance scores.  
 It is relevant to articulate that reference to “aid conditionality” in this section is used to 
provide one possible interpretation of the findings in the light of the extant literature. Hence, it is 
not the purpose of the study to consider “aid volatility” to be fundamentally the result of “aid 
conditionality”. The reason is that research does not substantively connect “aid conditionality” 
with “aid volatility” in Section 2. It is important to note also that many factors could account for 
aid volatility, among which, is the financial crisis that is mentioned in the introduction.  
Accordingly, the implicit mention of “aid conditionality” in this section should be understood in 
the light of the fact that there are many potential causes of aid volatility.   
 
4.3.2 Implications for domestic-driven governance  
 
 The findings can equally be understood from the perspective of internally-driven 
governance. In essence, aid instability could incite African governments to become more 
accountable to the electorate in exchange for more tax income. Hence, foreign aid instability may 
increase governance standards in recipient countries because, in the presence of such volatility, 
tax payers may only be willing to pay more taxes in exchange for better governance. Hence, 
reduction in aid may not be altogether a bad omen for recipient countries. It may simply push 
governments to adopt better governance standards in view of anticipating more tax revenues from 
the population. Moreover, reductions in the expectation of aid may lead governments to adopt 
better governance standards because countries facing a hard budget constraint make better use of 
available tax revenue. An eloquent example in Africa is Somaliland which has comparatively 
better governance standards despite the absence of official development assistance from donor 
countries. This case of Somaliland is documented in Eubank (2012). The findings of Eubank are 
particularly relevant for Africa given that Somaliland is ineligible for official foreign aid. 
The narrative is in line with the view that governments in recipient countries depend on 
tax income from local taxpayers in exchange for improved standards of government. Therefore, 
taxpayers could use their leverage to request enhanced governance standards from the 
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government in exchange for complying with their tax obligations. This view is consistent with a 
bulk of literature on the relationship between accountability and the dependence of government 
on domestic tax income (see Morton, 1994; Mahon, 2004, 2005; Moore, 2008; Bernstein and Lu, 
2008; Prichard, 2009).  
The arguments surrounding the improvement of government standards in exchange for tax 
income are deeply consolidated in the history of economic thought. As argued by Eubank (2012), 
the positive nexus between internal sources of funding like taxation and good governance, build 
on the negotiations by autocracies (which needed tax income in order to survive inter-state wars) 
and (citizens who were unwilling to accommodate more tax burden unless the autocracies 
improved accountability, public services and the quality of institutions). Within the framework of 
the findings, in the absence of foreign aid, the reliance of governments on local fiscal income 
endows taxpayers with a substantial leverage to request better governance standards in exchange 
for compliance with the payment of more taxes.  
 In the light of the above, the substantial reliance of a government on any particular source 
of funding will make the government dependent on the requirements of the funding source. 
Hence, just as we have seen  in the literature that donors can use foreign aid to influence 
government standards in developing countries (Kindiki, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013; Amin, 
2014), taxpayers can also collectively influence governance standards in the absence of foreign 
aid or instability in the flow of foreign aid. From logic and common sense, tax payers will 
naturally request for, inter alia: (i) better processes of political governance or the election and 
replacement of political leaders (i.e. “voice & accountability” and political stability); (ii) effective 
economic governance or the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public 
commodities (i.e. government effectiveness and regulation quality), and (iii) good institutional 
governance or the respect by the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions 
between them (i.e. corruption-control and the rule of law).  Moreover, over-reliance on foreign 
aid can constrain governments to be more accountable to donors than to citizens and the 
requirements from foreign donors may not necessarily be in the interest of better domestic 
governance and economic development. In essence, the adage of “no taxation without 
representation” can be extended to “no taxation without better governance” in the absence of 
foreign aid and in the presence of foreign aid instability.  
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 An alternative way of understanding  domestic-driven governance in this strand is that, 
countries with improving standards of government are also entitled to more development 
assistance because ‘aid volatility’ is correlated with improving indicators of governance, 
provided that such a trend is not limited to a first-order process of auto-regression (see Asongu 
and Nwachukwu, 2017a).   
 
4.3.3. More direct implications  
We have also observed that the effect of foreign aid instability is positively significant on general 
governance, while for the most part, it is not consistently significant in stimulating economic and 
institutional governance. Two implications derive from this finding. First, general governance 
may be substantially driven by political governance when it comes to the effect of aid 
instabilities. This may be because, in light of explanations provided in the previous sub-sections, 
the population may be more sensitive to ‘taxation for political representation, voice and 
accountability’, relative to economic and institutional governance.  
Second, the aggregation of governance indicators improves insights into how 
macroeconomic variables affect governance. Hence, as opposed to Kangoye (2013) who has 
reduced the concept of governance to corruption, conceiving, defining and measuring governance 
more inclusively in applied econometrics is relevant to advancing the scholarship on aid and 
institutions. As a policy implication, it is important to clearly articulate the concept of governance 
in applied econometrics in order to avoid misleading policy implications.  
 
5. Conclusions and future research directions  
 
 With the recent financial crisis and reduction of foreign aid by donor countries, the aid-
institutions debate is shifting to how aid instability affects governance in developing countries. 
We have assessed the role of foreign aid instability on governance dynamics in fifty three African 
countries for the period 1996-2010. An autoregressive endogeneity-robust Generalized Method of 
Moments has been employed. Instabilities are measured in terms of variance of the errors and 
standard deviations. Three main aid indicators are used, namely: total aid, aid from multilateral 
donors and bilateral aid. Principal Component Analysis is used to bundle governance indicators, 
namely: political governance (voice & accountability and political stability/nonviolence), 
economic governance (regulation quality and government effectiveness), institutional governance 
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(rule of law and corruption-control), and general governance (political, economic and 
institutional governance). Our findings show that foreign aid instability increases governance 
standards, especially political and general governance. Policy implications have been discussed.  
The policy implications are both relevant to donors and recipients of foreign aid. Moreover, the 
conclusions do not imply that stable foreign aid is not good for governance in recipient countries. 
 Two main caveats are clearly apparent from the study. First, due to methodological 
constraints, we are unable to control for thresholds in foreign aid dependency. In this light, the 
effect on governance in low and high aid-dependent (e.g. Mozambique) countries cannot easily 
be disassociated. Moreover, the measure of aid instability might miss country-specific volatility 
characteristics and linear trends. We cannot control for these factors because of concerns about 
instrument proliferation or over-identification. Accordingly, given that the basic requirement for 
the GMM approach is N>T, the use of sub-samples leads to pre-estimation N<T and post-
estimation instrument proliferation. Hence, future studies could focus on accounting for aid 
dependency thresholds as well as country-specific cases in order to improve on the extant 
literature on established relationships. Second, while the study has performed robustness checks 
by using different governance and aid variables, it would be worthwhile to use different 
indicators of governance and ‘aid intensity’ in future studies. Insights into this second point are 
documented in Kangoye (2013). Freedom House, Polity, and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) 
provide governance measures that may be worth considering. These recommendations are 
consistent with the need to account for more heterogeneity in foreign aid inquiries (Asiedu and 
Nandwa, 2007; Asiedu, 2014; Ssozi et al., 2019). Moreover, the findings could be influenced by 
changes in governments during the sampled periodicity. While the factors of changes in 
government are not considered due to data availability constraints, it is worthwhile for such 
factors to be considered in future research.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Aid1: NODASD1 (Total)  Instability of Total NODA by Simple Standard Deviation  Author 
   
Aid 2: NODADACSD1 Instability of NODADAC by Simple Standard Deviation.  
 
Author 
Aid 3: NODAMDSD1 Instability of NODAMD by Simple Standard Deviation 
 
Author 
Aid1: NODASD2 (Total)  Instability of Total NODA by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
Aid 2: NODADACSD2 Instability of NODADAC by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
Aid 3: NODAMDSD2 Instability of NODAMD by Standard Deviation of the 
Residuals after first-order autoregressive process.  
 
Author 
   
Political Stability  “Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will 
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and 
violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Voice & Accountability  “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free 
media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Political Governance  “First Principal Component of Political Stability and 
Voice & Accountability. The process by which those in 
authority are selected and replaced”. 
           PCA 
   
Government Effectiveness “Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments 
commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Regulation Quality  “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of 
the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Economic Governance  “First Principal Component of Government 
Effectiveness and Regulation Quality. The capacity of 
government to formulate & implement policies, and to 
deliver services”.  
              PCA 
   
Rule of Law “Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
   
Corruption Control  “Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which publicpower is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
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private interests”.  
   
Institutional Governance  “First Principal Component of Rule of Law and 
Corruption-Control. The respect for citizens and the state 
of institutions that govern the interactions among them” 
PCA 
   
General Governance   First principal component of Political Stability, Voice & 
Accountability, Government Effectiveness, Regulation 
Quality, Rule of Law and Corruption-Control.  
PCA 
2   
   
GDP growth  Gross Domestic Product growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Trade Openness  Exports plus Imports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
Government Expenditure  Government Final Consumption Expenditure(% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. NODADAC: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries. NODAMD: NODA from 
Multilateral Donors. SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation of the Residuals after 
first-order autoregressive processes.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
      
Total NODA 10.889 12.029 0.015 102.97 253 
Total NODADAC 6.278 7.303 -0.003 68.063 253 
Total NODADMD 4.525 5.083 0.004 33.249 253 
First Instability from Total NODA 2.841 6.460 0.001 64.113 250 
First Instability from Total NODADAC 1.868 4.790 0.0005 44.404 250 
First Instability from Total NODADMD 1.397 2.712 0.0006 29.353 250 
Second  Instability  from Total NODA 3.409 8.106 0.005 91.927 250 
Second  Instability from Total NODADAC 2.201 6.333 0.001 68.826 250 
Second  Instability from Total NODADMD 1.678 2.714 0.000 29.906 250 
Political Governance (PolGov) -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Economic Governance (EcoGov)  0.049 1.310 -3.019 3.290 254 
Institutional Governance (InstGov)  0.008 1.378 -3.879 3.179 264 
General Governance (G.Gov)  0.108 2.095 -5.139 5.086 254 
Corruption (Corruption Perception Index) 3.005 1.064 1.066 6.100 181 
GDP growth   4.755 5.587 -11.272 49.367 254 
Trade Openness  78.340 39.979 20.980 250.95 247 
Government Expenditure  4.495 8.064 -17.387 49.275 164 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. 
DAC: Development Assistance Committee. SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Instability by Standard 
Deviation of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis  
                
Control Variables Foreign Aid Instabilities Governance   
GDPg Trade Gov.E Inflation SD1Aid1 SD1Aid2 SD1Aid3 SD2Aid1 SD2Aid2 SD2Aid3 PolGov EcoGov InstGov G.Gov  Corruption   
1.000 0.179 0.254 -0.132 0.219 0.193 0.166 0.145 0.091 0.109 -0.012 -0.041 -0.084 -0.049 -0.056 GDPg 
 1.000 -0.070 0.024 0.082 0.050 0.047 0.105 0.091 -0.032 0.202 0.089 0.207 0.174 0.209 Trade 
  1.000 -0.243 0.014 0.024 0.072 0.028 0.028 0.051 -0.040 0.007 0.023 -0.003 -0.095 Gov. E 
   1.000 -0.004 0.011 -0.016 -0.003 0.006 0.016 -0.114 -0.169 -0.136 -0.149 -0.054 Inflation 
    1.000 0.921 0.793 0.949 0.878 0.678 -0.157 -0.293 -0.215 -0.244 -0.130 SD1Aid1 
     1.000 0.528 0.901 0.946 0.459 -0.160 -0.279 -0.224 -0.242 -0.129 SD1Aid2 
      1.000 0.718 0.515 0.902 -0.105 -0.252 -0.157 -0.191 -0.132 SD1Aid3 
       1.000 0.945 0.650 -0.109 -0.251 -0.179 -0.198 -0.118 SD2Aid1 
        1.000 0.452 -0.115 -0.228 -0.182 -0.191 -0.112 SD2Aid2 
         1.000 -0.074 -0.234 -0.153 -0.175 -0.161 SD2Aid3 
          1.000 0.758 0.819 0.901 0.745 PolGov 
           1.000 0.878 0.945 0.822 EcoGov 
            1.000 0.957 0.895 InstGov 
             1.000 0.875 G.Gov  
              1.000 Corruption 
                
GDPg: GDP growth rate. Gov. E: Government Expenditure. Aid1: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA). Aid2: NODA from the DAC countries. Aid3: NODA from Multilateral Donors. 
SD1: Instability by Simple Standard Deviation. SD2: Instability by Standard Deviation of the Residuals after first-order autoregressive processes.  PolGov: Political Governance. 
EcoGov: Economic Governance. InstGov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance.  
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